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STATE OF NEW YORK-BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 




Control No.: 02-063-19 B 
Appearances: Ann Connor Esq. 
Orleans County Public Defender 
6 Court Street 
Room 109 
Geneseo, New York 1445~ 
Decision appealed: January 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 
months. · 
Board Member(s) Coppola, Berliner 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived June 5, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Tran.script, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
~ 
Affirmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to -.-----
~rmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified tO' ___ _ 
/.. 
_ Affirmed ·-Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the .related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ~te fjndings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on /tJ/J1 // 4J 6{ . 
I I 
Distribution: Appeals Unit -Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
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    Appellant challenges the January 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant’s instant offense involved him, after acting as a peeping 
Tom, grabbing and strangling the victim, raping her, and killing her, and then burying her in a 
shallow grave in the woods. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and 
capricious in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 
2) the decision illegally resentenced him. 3) the decision was predetermined. 4) the decision failed 
to list any facts in support of the statutory standard cited. 5) the Board ignored the positive portions 
of the COMPAS. 
 
         Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability 
that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that 
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
  
   The record demonstrates that the Parole Board considered the relevant statutory factors, 
including petitioner's record in prison and postrelease plans, before concluding in its discretion 
that, due to the serious and violent nature of the crime and petitioner's other violent conduct, 
petitioner is not an acceptable candidate for release on parole.”  Matter of Thurman v. Hodges, 
292 A.D.2d 872, 873, 739 N.Y.S.2d 324 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 
(2002); accord Matter of Shapard v. Zon, 30 A.D.3d 1098, 1099, 815 N.Y.S.2d 852, 853 (4th Dept. 
2006). 
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      The Board may consider the deviant nature of the crime. Wellman v Dennison, 23 A.D.3d 974, 
805 N.Y.S.2d 159 (3d  Dept. 2005). 
   The record reflects that the Board properly considered the required factors and adequately set 
forth its reasons for denying parole.  The Board is not required to give each factor equal weight 
and may place greater emphasis on the gravity of the inmate’s offense.  Matter of Jones v. New 
York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 151 A.D.3d 1622, 57 N.Y.S.3d 265 (4th Dept. 
2017); Matter of Kenefick v. Sticht, 139 A.D.3d 1380, 31 N.Y.S.3d 367 (4th Dept. 2016); Matter 
of Fischer v. Graziano, 130 A.D.3d 1470, 12 N.Y.S.3d 756, 756 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 132 A.D.3d 
1331, 17 N.Y.S.3d 344 (2015); Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 
872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Freeman v. Fischer, 118 A.D.3d 1438, 988 N.Y.S.2d 780 (4th 
Dept. 2014). 
    The Board may take note of the inmate’s disregard for the life of another human being. Hakim v 
Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept 2003); Angel v Travis, 1 A.D.3d 589, 767 
N.Y.S.2d 290 (3d Dept 2003). 
    The Board may acknowledge the senseless and violent nature of the crime. Sanchez v Dennison, 
21 A.D.3d 1249, 801 N.Y.S.2d 423 (3d Dept. 2005); Dorman v New York State Board of Parole, 
30 A.D.3d 880, 816 N.Y.S.2d 765  (3d Dept. 2006). 
   As for community opposition, the Board may receive and consider written communications from 
individuals, other than those specifically identified in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A), opposing an 
inmate’s release to parole supervision.  Matter of Applewhite v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 167 
A.D.3d 1380, 91 N.Y.S.3d 308, 311 (3d Dept. 2018) (“Contrary to petitioner’s contention, we do 
not find that [the Board’s] consideration of certain unspecified ‘consistent community opposition’ 
to his parole release was outside the scope of the relevant statutory factors that may be taken into 
account in rendering a parole release determination”), appeal dismissed, 2019 N.Y. LEXIS 
622 (Mar. 28, 2019); Matter of Clark v. New York Bd. of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531, 89 N.Y.S.3d 
134 (1st Dept. 2018) (“the Board permissibly considered letters in opposition to the parole 
application submitted by public officials and members of the community”); Matter of Grigger v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 11 A.D.3d 850, 852–53, 783 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (3d Dept. 2004) 
(recognizing 259-i(2)(c)(A)(v)’s list is not the exclusive information the Board may consider and 
persons in addition to victims and their families may submit letters), lv. denied, 4 N.Y.3d 704, 792 
N.Y.S.2d 1 (2005); see also Matter of Jordan v. Hammock, 86 A.D.2d 725, 447 N.Y.S.2d 44 (3d 
Dept. 1982) (letters from private citizens are protected and remain confidential); Matter of Rivera v. 
Evans, Index No. 0603-16, Decision & Order dated July 5, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Co.)(LaBuda 
A.J.S.C.) (recognizing “[c]onsideration of community or other opposition was proper under the 
statute” and the Board is required to keep identity of persons opposing release confidential), aff’d 
sub nom. Matter of Rivera v. Stanford, 53 N.Y.S.3d 404, 149 A.D.3d 1445 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Strawitch, Carl DIN: 94-A-6683  
Facility: Orleans CF AC No.:  02-063-19 B 
    
Findings: (Page 3 of 5) 
 
of Hamilton v. New York State Bd. of Parole, Index # 3699-2013, Order and Judgment dated 
October 25, 2013 (Devine J.S.C.)(Albany Co. Court)(no showing of prejudice by allegedly false 
information in PBA online petition where Board acknowledged public opposition during interview), 
aff’d, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014); cf. Krebs v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 
No. 9:08-CV-255NAMDEP, 2009 WL 2567779, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2009) (public and 
political pressure “are permissible factors which parole officials may properly consider as they 
relate to ‘whether ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate 
the seriousness of the offense as to undermine respect for the law’”); Morel v. Thomas, No. 02 CV 
9622 (HB), 2003 WL 21488017, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2003) (same); Seltzer v. Thomas, No. 
03 CIV.00931 LTS FM, 2003 WL 21744084, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2003) (same).   The same 
has also long been recognized as true with respect to letters supporting an inmate’s potential parole 
release.  See, e.g., Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d at 1273, 990 
N.Y.S.2d at 719 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Gaston v. Berbary, 16 A.D.3d 1158, 1159, 791 
N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (4th Dept. 2005); Matter of Torres v. New York State Div. of Parole, 300 
A.D.2d 128, 129, 750 N.Y.S.2d 759, 760 (1st Dept. 2002); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 
360, 362, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (1st Dept. 1998); cf. Cardenales v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 371, 371, 
830 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (1st Dept. 2007) (Board permissibly determined offense outweighed other 
positive factors including letters of support from, among others, victim’s mother).  Indeed, 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5(c)(2) refers to the security of letters either in support of or in opposition to 
an inmate’s release.   
   Credibility of an inmates explanation is to be made by the Board. The Board may consider the 
inmate’s capacity to tell the truth, and how this impacts on the statutory factors. Siao-Pao v 
Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1st Dept. 2008). There is a strong rehabilitative 
component in the statute that may be given effect by considering  insight.  Matter of Silmon v. 
Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000).   
   There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-
finders.  See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 
2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 
957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal 
policies in fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 
(2000). There is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense.  
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 
2000). Nor was any penal philosophy discussed. Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption 
that the Board complied with its duty.  See Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 
A.D.2d 412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d Dept. 1985). 
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   That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) 
in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.”  Matter of Mullins 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 
2012).  The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute.  Matter 
of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d 
Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 
796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release 
as “contrary to the best interest of the community”); Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 
920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011) (Board provided adequate statutory rationale). 
   The COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs 
as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory 
factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that 
the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors 
including the instant offense.  The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards 
that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an 
additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes 
of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. 
Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  That is exactly what occurred here.   
   Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
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      Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079.  An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and 
without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d 
Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason 
or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  Siao-Paul 
v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Hanna v New York State Board of Parole, 
169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019). 
   In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
